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Cyclical Price Fluctuations  
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German Call-by-Call Telephone Market 
 




Abstract: The 2002 prices of suppliers in the German call-by-call telephone market 
are rather dispersed, out-of-phase (uncorrelated), and show systematic down-up 
movements. In 2004, these prices are less dispersed, more in-phase and show more 
upwards runs than down-ups. In both years, we clearly do not observe Edgeworth 
cycles where prices move in parallel (in-phase). We present a model with demand 
inertia, caused by incomplete information about prices, where (out-of-phase and in-
phase) cycles as well as competitive equilibria and tacit collusion equilibria exist. The 
transition from the 2002 cycles in the German call-by-call market to more constant 
prices in 2004 may be due to parameter changes, such as customers possessing 
improved information.  
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I. Evidence of cyclical price fluctuations 
 
Since 1998, the German telephone market has been liberalised. The incumbent 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) is no longer a monopolist but is faced with competition from 
some 30 other firms. Customers may switch to another provider or remain customer 
of DT (and pay the related fixed costs) but buy service on a call-by-call basis. In the 
latter case, a customer has to pre-dial the number of the provider she selects and 
then, in the case of national calls, she continues to dial the DT-number of the 
participant she wants to be connected with. 
 
Thanks to the liberalisation, the price of telephone calls has decreased considerably 
– for domestic long distance calls, at the end of 2002 the average price on working 
days was only 7 % of that in 1997 (Regulierungsbeörde für Telekommunikation und 
Post, 2003). Such a development is undoubtedly a great success in terms of welfare, 
but it is not the topic of this paper. Instead of that we want to discuss a phenomenon 
we observed in the 2002 call-by-call market. 
 
The suppliers in this market are free to change their prices as often as they want. 
Some of them (who provide also other services by telephone) are price constrained,   
but there are no restrictions on price changes. The usual sources of price information 
are either the internet or newspapers. Many local newspapers publish the lowest 
prices each Monday. So, usually you have a price list close to your telephone which 
has to be updated from time to time. If you call the cheapest supplier from a “fresh” 
price list you often get no connection – demand is above his capacity. If you call the 
cheapest supplier from an older price list you often make the experience that the 
price announced (not all suppliers announce the price in advance) is higher than the 
price in the list. 
 
With this anecdotal experience in mind we had, in 2003, a closer look at the 2002 
data. In Figure 1, the price development of the three suppliers with the lowest 
average prices (6.85 to 7.16 cent for a three minute call) are shown. First, apparently 
prices are highly volatile. Second, there is a “systematic” up then down of prices 
during the whole year. We observe similar price movements also for the next 
cheapest suppliers – up to No 13 who is the first with a nearly constant price (12 cent   4
on average, only one price change). There were additional suppliers (DT required 
36.7 cent!), but they probably did not play a significant role in this market segment.
2 
The systematic character of the fluctuations can  also be seen from Table 1. Those 
suppliers who change prices more than once apparently followed an up-down (or 
better down-up) pattern, possibly with constant prices for some periods but not with 
up or down movements consisting of several steps. The 3 + 34 = 37 price increases 
and the 31 + 8 = 39 price decreases are not distributed evenly. Chi-square tests 
show, in both cases a high level of significance (p = 3 • 10
-7, 2 • 10
-4).  It seemed that 
the suppliers followed a policy where, first, they attracted customers by low prices 
and, afterwards, exploited those customers who were not completely up to date with 
their price information. 
 
   2002 
A previous  
2004 
A previous  















31 8  10  2 
 
Table 1: The down and up of individual prices in 2002 and in the first eight month of 
2004. 
 
A third attribute of the price fluctuations in 2002 is the fact that prices did not move 
parallel to one another, i.e. they are not “in-phase”. This eye catching trait is 
supported by the correlation matrix of the nine cheapest suppliers. (See Table 2.) 
The correlation coefficients are, in general, rather low and half of them are negative 
(3 positive, 6 between –0.05 and +0.05, and 10 negative). There are two suppliers 
with identical prices. The missing values in the matrix are due to lacking parallel 
existence of the suppliers or to constant prices of one supplier during the period of 
co-existence. 
 
                                            
2 There is no information available on quantities sold.   5
The central question of this paper is whether such behavior could be equilibrium 
behavior. For this purpose we will investigate a symmetric two-person game with two 
possible prices. A customer knows with probability α the current prices or she knows 
only last period’s prices. We assume the suppliers to use Markov strategies and to 
maximise “average values” over an infinite horizon. Requirements of symmetric 
equilibria and independence of initial conditions are used as selection devices.  We 
indicate a region of prices and probabilities (for knowing the actual price) where 
equilibria with permanent price fluctuations exist. So, in this model price cycles can 
occur but need not occur.  
 
In the German call-by-call market, there does not seem to be a necessity of price 
cycles either as a look at the data of 2004 shows (Figure 2). The cheapest supplier 
required a constant price and the down and up in 2002 seems to be substituted by 
upwards runs in 2004. The structure is still significantly different from a random 
distribution of the ups and downs (Chi-square tests: p = 0.05, 0.02) but it is 
apparently a different structure (Chi-square tests: p = 2 • 10
-14, 3 • 10
-15). Prices 
between suppliers
3 do not fluctuate in 2004 (average 
2 σ  of the nine cheapest 
suppliers = 3.7) as much as in 2002 (average 
2 σ of the nine cheapest suppliers = 
10.7). Also the correlation matrix (Table 3) has a different structure: there are 14 
positive correlation coefficients and 8 negative, 6 of them with the same supplier 
(none between –0.05 and +0.05). In addition, the distribution of the cheapest prices 
among the suppliers changed remarkably, even if we take into account that a 
supplier in 2002 existed only 45 % of the periods (average of the cheapest nine 
suppliers) while a supplier in 2004 existed 97 % of the periods. 
 
In Section III, we discuss the generalization of our model with respect to more prices 
and more players. Our conclusion is that the cycles are equilibrial also under such 
conditions. In Section IV, we compare our model with some dynamic pricing models 
from the literature. Section V concludes. 
 
                                            
3 The variances of prices of single suppliers between periods are given in Tables 2 and 3. They do not 
vary considerably.   6
















   
Figure 1: Price (three minute call) of the three cheapest suppliers in 2002.  
               Source: www.billiger-telefonieren.de (own graphical representation). 
  2.  3.  4. 5.  6. 7. 8. 9. mean 
price 
Var 1* 2* 3* 
1.Junior  Tel.  0.4            0.1  6.9  1.6  26  10  12 
2.  01081            0.6  7.2  1.4  4  30  0 
3. Telebillig      1.0  -0.7    -0.2 -0.1 0  7.2  0.9  32  8  30 
4. Pennyph.        -0.7    -0.2 -0.1 0  7.2  0.9  6  10  6 
5. Ph.dump            -0.5 0  0  7.2  2.1  4  0  6 
6.  Ph.craft          -0.2 -0.6 7.3  0.6  4  26  6 
7.  Maxbell          -0.2 0 7.3  1.4  4  2  0 
8.  Fonfux           0 7.5  1.1  6  0  12 
9.  Telestunt             12.0  9.9  18  8  0 
Others                  12  16  18 
 
Table 2: Correlation of prices of the 9 cheapest suppliers in 2002. * Frequencies (%) 
of cheapest (1), second cheapest (2), and third cheapest (3) price. In case of ties the 
lowest rank is used. Therefore the percentages need not add up to 100. 
   7
 
 



























































































Figure 2: Price (three minute call) of the three cheapest suppliers in Jan. – Aug. 
2004. Source: www.billiger-telefonieren.de (own graphical representation). 
 
 
 2.  3.  4.  5.  6. 7.  8. 9.  mean
price 
Var 1*  2*  3* 
1.  Interroute             3.0  0  100  0  0 
2.  Freenet    0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4   -0.6 5.0  0.4 0  48  24 
3. 01081      0.7  0.7  0.5 0.8   -0.5 5.5  0.8 0  3  42 
4. 01030        -0.1  0.7 0.7   -0.3 5.9  2.1 0  36  0 
5. Callax          0.4 0.9   -0.7 6.8  5.6 0  3  30 
6.  Telestunt         1.0   -0.7 6.9  0.7 0  0  0 
7. SurpriseT                 -0.7 7.0  0.3 0  0  0 
8.  Telebillig             7.5  0  0  0  0 
9.  01015             7.8  3.9 0  12  18 
Others                  0  0  0 
 
Table 3: Correlation of prices of the 9 cheapest suppliers in 2004 (Jan. – August).  
* Frequencies (%) of cheapest (1), second cheapest (2), and third cheapest (3) price. 
In case of ties the lowest rank is used. Therefore the percentages need not add up to 
100.   8
II. A duopoly model 
 
Let us assume that every consumer carries out an individual but fixed number of 
telephone calls per period, independent of the price of a call. The prices of the 
suppliers determine which supplier she chooses but they do not influence overall 
demand. 
 
There are two suppliers with zero costs who determine their prices  {} 1 , r pt
i ∈ , i = 1, 2,  
0 < r < 1, in every period t anew. With probability α, a consumer is informed about the 
prices of period t, with probability 1 - α, she only knows the prices of period t –1 (she 
has an outdated list). The consumer decides on the basis of the information she has, 




i p p <  (or  1 1 − − < t
j
t
i p p  if only the prices of period t – 1 are known) then i gets the 
whole demand. If prices are equal she decides by chance. The whole market 
demand is normalised to 1. 
 
Thus there are four different price combinations as indicated in Table 4. The profits 
U1(Kt-1, Kt), Kt-1, Kt ∈ {A, B, C, D} of firm (player) 1 are computed in Table 5. Please 
note that, in any case, consumers pay period t’s prices. Take the case (Kt-1, Kt) = (D, 
A). With probability α, Kt is known and Firm 1 gets r/2. With probability 1 - α, only Kt-1 
is known which again implies that both firms get half the market demand, i.e. firm 1’s 
profit is again pt ⋅1/2 = r/2. 
 
  Firm 1’s prices 
 r  1 
r A  B 
 
Firm 2’s prices 
1 C  D 
 
Table 4: The possible price combinations.   9
 
   K t-1 A  B  C  D 







Profit if t-1 
is relevant
 














A r  r/2  r/2  αr/2 r(1-α/2)  r/2 
B 1  0  (1 - α)/2  0  1 - α (1  -  α)/2 
C r  r  (1 + α)r/2  αr  r  (1 + α)r/2 
D 1  1/2  1/2  α/2 1  -  α/2  1/2 
 
Table 5: Profits U1(Kt-1, Kt) of firm 1 in period t. A consumer knows Kt with probability 
α and she knows Kt-1 (but not Kt) with probability 1 - α. 
 
Concerning the long-term goal of the firms we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that 
the firms do not discount but want to maximise their “average pay-off”, i.e. 
(1)  ) , (
1















with a certain initial K0. In this objective function only those price combinations which 
occur infinitely often are relevant. So K0 is only important because it may initialise a 
certain path (Kt)t= 0, 1, … but not in itself. For example, if the price policies of the 
competitors imply a permanent fluctuation between price combinations B and D then 
V1 =  2
1  (U1(B, D) + U1(D, B)). 
 
By interchanging the roles of firm 1 and firm 2 we get the profits of firm 2. 
 
Subgames in this infinite game are described by the price structure of the last period. 
In the following, we want to concentrate on Markov strategies, i.e. we require 
identical strategies in identical subgames. Thus a Markov strategy si of firm i is a 
mapping 
   10
(2) si : {A, B, C, D} → {r, 1}. 
 
So, we can describe si by 
  








D),   x
i
K∈{r, 1}, K = A, B, C, D, i = 1, 2 
 
Every pair of strategies results in a dynamic price structure as indicated by the 
examples in Figure 4. (a) is a case with permanent price fluctuations, evaluated V1 = 
2
1  (U(B, C) + U(C, B)) by 1. (b) results in a permanent price structure D, evaluated 
U(D, D) by 1. (c) depends on the initial condition, the cycle is evaluated  3
1  (U(A, B) 
+ U(B, C) + U(C, A)). Permanent price structures as D in (b) and (c) are also called 
stationary points. They are special cycles. 
 
 A   B   A   B   A   B 
 C   D   C   D   C   D 
  ( a )      ( b )      ( c )  
 
Figure 3: Price development under strategies (a): s1 = (1, r, 1, r) and s2 = (r, 1, r, r).  
(b): s1 = (1, r, r, 1) and s2 = (r, 1, r, 1). (c): s1 = (r, r, r, 1) and s2 = (r, 1, r, 1). 
Bold faces letters indicate stationary states. 
 
The strategy profiles and the resulting dynamics as indicated in Figure 3 are 
isomorphic. So, we will often use the dynamics and the strategy profiles 
synonymously. 
 
The number of Nash equilibria in our model is large. So we need selection principles.    11
Selection principles: (i)  Only equilibria with deterministic strategies and symmetric 
cycles are selected. 
  (ii) Only equilibria which have “connected” dynamics are 
selected, i.e. those which have only one equilibrium cycle. 
  
From (i) follows that only equilibria with cycles A, D, A ↔ D, and B ↔ C are selected. 
(ii) means that we will arrive at the same cycle from every possible state. In the 
following, we will investigate for which parameter constellations which of these cycles 
are supported by equilibria. The proofs of the following lemmas are in the appendix. 
 
Lemma 1: The stationary point D is an equilibrium cycle if and only if 
 
(4)  3 / 2 ≤ r . 
 
















≥ α  
 

















≤ α . 
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Figure 4: Parameter values which support the equilibrium cycle A ↔ D (Lemma 2). 
 
Figure 5: Parameter values which support the equilibrium cycle B ↔ C (Lemma 3). 
 
Lemma 4: A is an equilibrium cycle if and only if 
 
(10)   α≥(1-2r)/(1-r). 
 
Theorem: The selected equilibrium cycles are those of Figure 6. 
 


























1 2/3  1/2  r 
α 
   
1 
 
1/2   13
 
Figure 6: The selected equilibrium cycles: A is an equilibrium on the right of the A-
curve, D on the left of the D-curve, B ↔ C below the dashed curve, and A ↔ D 
above the less bold line.  
 
The competitive equilibrium cycle A occurs for large enough r and/or large enough α 
values, the tacit collusion equilibrium D with permanent high prices prevails for 
parameter values with small enough r. Cycles occur for low r values, the “out-of-
phase” cycle B ↔ C for low α, and the “in-phase” cycle A ↔ D for large α. 
 
In a model as simple as the duopoly model above we might ask why consumers do 
not anticipate the firms’ behavior. In a real market with several firms and “more 
stochastic” price fluctuations, it is difficult to develop “rational expectations” in the 
sense of perfect forecasts. Thus, aiming to describe the 2002 situation of the German 
call-by-call market with such a simple model, it seems to be sensible not to provide 
our consumers with rational expectations. 
 
One can think of many other possibilities to “improve” the model, for example, 
introducing more prices or more suppliers or a more distributed price information. 
The first two extensions will be discussed in the next section. We will see that the 
main result, namely the possibility of "out-of-phase" price cycles, does not change. 
 











2/3   14
III. More prices, more players  
 
Maskin and Tirole (1988), in a duopoly model with a finite number of prices and 
alternating prices choices, show the existence of tacit collusion equilibria 
(corresponding to D) as well as “Edgeworth cycle”. (See Figure 7.) 
 
Figure 7: Edgeworth cycles 
 
The competitors undercut one another until a “lowest price” is reached, then one of 
them jumps to a high price and the cycle starts anew. As this means “parallel” moves 
(correlated prices) such an equilibrium corresponds (if at all) to our cycle A ↔ D, but 
not to B ↔ C. Note that contrary to Maskin and Tirole (1988), D is not always an 
equilibrium and, therefore, not always selected by the principle of renegotiation 
proofness. 
 
With n prices from the interval [r, 1] and with many prices close to r, a kind of trigger 
strategy is possible in our (generalised) model: If one player deviates from an 
equilibrium cycle the other player chooses one of these low prices one after the other 
until, finally, he chooses a price which allows the other to return to the cycle. (Note 
that he employs a Markov strategy.) The deviating player can choose always r and 
thus, with enough prices close to r,  earn about r. Instead, he could choose 
alternating r and 1 and would get (αr +(1-α))/2. The latter profit, however, is always 
smaller than ½, the profit in D. Prices between r and 1 apparently do not make sense 















With m players, a joint trigger strategy would be even more effective. After one player 
deviates from the equilibrium path, all others, except 1, require r for many periods. 
After some time a price combination is reached where the deviating player is allowed 
to return to the cycle. The requirements of Markov strategies and of (ii) “one cycle” 
mean that the number of prices determine the maximal length of the “punishment 
periods”. Thus, the following lemma applies. 
 
Lemma 5: With many prices, all equilibrium cycles which guarantee profits larger 
than max{r, (αr+1-α)}/(m-1) for all players are equilibria.  
 
Corollary 1: With m players and “enough” prices, a sufficient condition for the tacit 
collusion equilibrium (1, 1, …, 1) to exist is 
 
(11)   r<  (m-1)/m.   
 
Are also Edgeworth Cycles equilibrial? If the price decreases “uniformly” from 1 to r 














+ = ∫ . 
 
Corollary 2: With m players and “enough” prices, a sufficient condition for an 
Edgeworth cycle equilibrium to exist is r<(m-1)/(m+1). 
 
The following plausibility argument emphasises the role of the price bounderies r and 
1. If the number of players is large there is, in the face of the plethora of equilibria, a 
coordination problem. Players who doubt that trigger strategies are used are 
tempted, say in the case of D, to deviate by choosing a price “just below 1”. The 
same argument applies for all other stationary points. So let us assume that more 
complicate strategies result when the number of players is large. If a player, 
however, expects that, in all situations there is at least one other player requiring r’ or 
less, then it is always suboptimal for him to reply with prices larger than r’ and smaller 
than 1. A price between r’ and 1 would become relevant only if he had required the 
lowest price (or one of the lowest prices) in the round before – but then he is better   16
off with an actual price of 1. If everybody chooses prices which are either =1 or ≤ r’, 
then it seems to make sense never to use r’, etc. In the end, we have a situation 
where everybody uses only prices r and 1. Such a situation would be self-stabilising 
if, in every situation, at least two suppliers chose r.  The most simple of these cases 
are, for 3 players, the cycle (1,r,r)→ (r,1,r) →(r,r,1) →(1,r,r) and, for 4 players, the 
cycle (1,1,r,r)↔(r,r,1,1). Also outside the cycle, the players must use strategies with 
“many r’s”. 
 
This is no formal selection criterion but it emphasises the role of the extreme prices 
and the value of the previous section. 
 
IV. Alternative Models 
 
In a previous simulation study with discounting, with capacity restrictions, and with 
different selection criteria, we found already that price fluctuations could be equilibrial 
depending on the parameter values. (Baier and Bolle, 2004). Here, we have relied on 
exact poofs. 
 
In the last section, we mentioned the model by Maskin and Tirole (1988) which 
focuses on Edgeworth Cycle Equilibria and Tacit Collusion Equlibria. There are 
apparently many other equilibria but they are not investigated. 
 
Empirical studies have shown that, in the gasoline market, sometimes Edgeworth 
cycles are observed and sometimes constant prices (Eckert, 2002, 2003, Noel, 
2003). In any case, our data do not show Edgeworth cycles, neither in 2002 nor in 
2004. It also seems to be plausible that, in 2004, we observe prices closer to 
competitive prices than in 2002, i.e. we do not seem to have moved into the direction 
of Tacit Collusion. 
 
While the driving force for Edgeworth cycles is the assumption of alternative moves, 
our cycles are based on incomplete information which causes demand inertia. Selten 
(1965), in his seminal article on competition with demand inertia mentions explicitly 
the possibility of lacking price information. The resulting prices in his model, however, 
do not show cycles but follow a “turnpike” movement. As far as we know, there are   17
no other models of this kind which produce cycles. Rosenthal (1982) assumes 
another variant of demand inertia: In a duopoly, a buyer is loyal as long as “his” seller 
does not change his price. But this model does not lead to cycles either. 
 
Green and Porter (1984) report stochastic price movements as consequences from 
stochastic demand and collusion. This might be an interesting model for other 
industries but, in our data, we do not find traces of complete collusion. 
 
So it seems that this special form of demand inertia which we hypothesise, possibly 
to be called information inertia, gives rise to a cycle type which has not been 
described before. 
 
V. Cyclical price fluctuations: A transition problem or a case for 
regulation? 
 
The model in Section II showed the theoretical possibility, not the necessity, of 
cyclical price fluctuations. So, the fact that we found such price policies in 2002 does 
not necessarily imply that they are perpetuated and, in fact, they are not. It is 
possible that the market situation (described by parameters as, for example, α ) has 
changed or that the consumers have learnt about the price policies of some suppliers 
and now look for suppliers with constant prices. In the latter case, the price 
fluctuations observed in 2002 might have been merely a temporary problem, rising 
and fading away during the transition from a monopoly to a truly competitive market. 
But how can we know?   
 
In our model as well as in reality some firms seem to exploit the incomplete 
information of many consumers. We cannot exclude that the relatively constant 
prices in 2004 will be followed by a period of high volatility again. The consumers can 
be misled by frequent price fluctuations they can only keep track of with prohibitive 
costs. Though, in our simplified model with price independent aggregate demand, the 
sum of consumers’ plus producers’ profits is not affected by prices, we suggest that 
the regulatory authority enforce measures against such policies. One measure is that 
all suppliers be obliged to announce their price before they deliver their service. 
Many firms do this already but not all. Even if one decides to go on, i.e. to buy the   18
service though the announced price is higher than last week’s price (which one 
knows), perhaps the next time one will avoid this supplier. 
 
Another measure would be an obligatory period (say four weeks) following a price 
decrease during which a price can be lowered but not be increased. One must be 
careful, however, with the introduction of such irreversible price policies. In  Bolle and 
Breitmoser (2004) it is shown, in a general duopoly model, that such restrictions 
largely facilitate tacit collusion. 
 
So, it is not easy to give clear advise against exploitive cyclical price policies but, 
nonetheless, this problem should be given attention by the regulatory authority.   19
 Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Because of the symmetry of the equilibrium we have to 
investigate only whether player 1 has an incentive to deviate from D. Let us assume 
that player 2 chooses s
*
2=(1,r,r,1). Then Player 1’s options are as in Figure 9. 
 
  A    B 
  C    D  
 




The two choices he has in every point (he can stay in the bold letter points) can be 
composed to cycles D, B, A↔C, ADCA, and ACBA. His profit in B is 0, in A↔C it 
is (U(A, C) + U(C, B))/2 = 3r/4 which is not larger than the profit in D under (4). In the 
case of ADCA, Player 1 gets 
2 6
1 r
+ , so that D is again superior under (4). ACDA is 
always less profitable than D. So, (4) is sufficient for D being an equilibrium. 
 
Are there other strategies s2 where D prevails as an equilibrium under weaker 
conditions? For all s2= (1,.,.,1), again the cycle A↔C is possible. For (.,., 1, 1) the 
cycle C is possible which leads to the stronger condition r<1/2. s2= (r, r, r, 1) is 
excluded by selection principle (i) because D would be isolated. So only s2= (r, 1, r, 
1) remains to be investigated. This strategy provides Player 1 with the options of 
Figure 9. 
A   B 
 
 
  C    D 
 
Figure 9: The options of Player 1 under s2= (r,1,r,1). 
   20
In addition to D, cycles A, C ↔ B,  BDCB, ABCA, and ABDCA are possible. ABCA 
requires r ≤ 1/2 to make D an equilibrium, i.e. again a stricter condition than (4) 
applies. 
 
So, (4) is also necessary for D to be an equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let us start with a strategy profile s1
* = s2
* = (1, r, r, r) which 
results in the options visualised in Figure 10. 
 
  A    B 
  C   D 
 
Figure 10: The options of player 1 under s2
* = (1, r, r, r). 
 
What are Player 1’s options, given that Player 2 choose s2
*? The possible deviations 
from s1
* result in cycles B, A ↔ C, A, C, B, A, and A,,D, B, A. As his profit is 0 for a 
cycle B, he will never deviate from s1 in such a way. A ↔ D is as least as profitable 
for him as the other cycles if 
 











⎛ + r r r
, 
 






1 r r r





⎛ + , 



















α α . 
 
These relations are equivalent to (5), (6), and (7) in Lemma 2. Because the 
respective arguments apply for Player 2 the “if” part of Lemma 2 is proven. In 
addition, we know that (s1
*, s2
*) is not an equilibrium if one of the relations is violated. 
The question remains whether there are other strategy profiles with the equilibrium 
cycle A ↔ D under weaker conditions. 
   21
If Player 2 chooses s2 =  ( 1 ,  r ,  1 ,  r )  o r  s 2 = (1, 1, 1, 1) then Player 1 has the 
opportunity to install the cycle A, C, D, A (and also other cycles). This would always 
be profitable as  
 






1 r r r





⎛ + α α  
 











α  for r > 0 (which is assumed). 
 
If Player 2 chooses s2 = (1, 1, r, r) then Player 1 can install the cycle B ↔ C as well 
as A ↔ C. B ↔ C is not more profitable than A ↔ D if α > ½. A ↔ C was also 
possible under s
*
2 and requires (5). The two requirements (5) and α ≥ ½ are more 
demanding than (5), (6), and (7). (See Figure 4.) So, there are no further parameter 
values supporting A ↔ D.  
 
Proof of Lemma 3: Let us first regard s1
* = (1, r, 1, r), s2
* = (r, 1, r, r). What are 
Player 1’s options, given that Player 2 chooses s2
*? In addition to B ↔ C, he can 
install cycles A, B ↔ D, ABDA, and ABCA. 
 
A is always worse for him than B ↔ C. The cycles B ↔ D, ABDA and ABCA are 
worse under weaker conditions than (14) and (15). 
 
Player 2’s options are the same as that of a Player 1 who is confronted with s2** = (1, 
1, r, r). In this case, Player 1 can install A ↔ C, B ↔ D, A ↔ D, ADBCA, and 
ACBDA. A ↔ C adds the condition (8) and A ↔ D as well as the two four-step cycles 
add (9).  
 
Thus the “if” part has been proven. It is also clear that the three conditions are 
necessary for (s1
*, s2
*) to be an equilibrium. Is B ↔ C supported by other equilibria? 
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For s2 = (r, 1, r, 1) or s2 = (1, 1, r, 1) Player 1 can install D which is always more 
profitable than B ↔ C. s2 = (1, 1, r, r) has just been investigated. So there are no 
additional equilibria and Lemma 3 is proven. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: If Player 2 chooses (r, r, r, r) then Player 1 can only install, in 
addition to A, the cycles B and A ↔ B. B is connected with 0 profit while A ↔ B 
requires (10) in order not to be more profitable than A. 
 
If Player 2 chooses 1 in B then Player 1 could install the more profitable cycle B ↔ C. 
If Player 2 chooses 1 in C or 1 in D then Player 1 would install the cycles C or D 
which are both more profitable for him than A.   23
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